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The Potential Unintended 
Consequences of the O’Bannon Decision 
Matthew J. Parlow* 
Abstract 
The O’Bannon decision made a significant change to one of 
the philosophical pillars of intercollegiate athletics in allowing for 
greater compensation for student athletes. At the same time, the 
court took only an incremental step in the direction of pay for 
college athletes: The decision was limited to football and men’s 
basketball players—as opposed to non-revenue-generating sports—
and it set a yearly cap of $5,000 for each of these athletes. 
However, the court left open the possibility for—indeed, it almost 
seemed to invite—future challenges to the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association’s restrictions on student-athlete 
compensation. In this regard, the court’s incremental step in 
college athlete pay may be a harbinger of more dramatic and 
structural changes to come in the college athletic system. While 
this Essay does not take a normative position on the legal or 
economic justifications for such a possible change in 
intercollegiate athletics, it does seek to describe some of the 
potential unintended consequences of a free(r) marketplace for 
student-athlete services. In particular, this Essay analyzes the 
possible implications and impact on Title IX, as well as college 
athletic opportunities and values more generally. In doing so, this 
Essay attempts to explain why the court’s more cautious approach 
may be needed going forward to balance the varied interest in the 
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I. Introduction 
The O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association1 
case sent shockwaves through the sports law world. The case was 
particularly notable because it advanced the ability of certain 
college athletes to receive greater compensation than under the 
restrictive rules of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA). At the same time, the $5,000 cap that the district court 
set for athlete pay made the decision somewhat more limited in 
its immediate impact.2 However, the district court’s decision left 
open future challenges to the NCAA’s anticompetitive restrictions 
on college athlete compensation that may well overcome the 
procompetitive justifications. In fact, the district court almost 
seemed to invite future plaintiffs to bring lawsuits that sought 
even greater levels of compensation. Such challenges could 
raise—or even eliminate entirely—this $5,000 cap and thus 
dramatically alter the system of college athletics. Indeed, 
subsequent challenges to the NCAA could well bring about the 
                                                                                                     
 1. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 2. See Permanent Injunction, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
No. C-09-3329-CW, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (limiting NCAA college athlete 
pay to $5,000). 
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“[f]ar [g]rander [c]hange” that Professor Marc Edelman hopes will 
flow from the O’Bannon decision.3  
This Essay does not seek to normatively assess the merits of 
further compensating student athletes for competing in collegiate 
athletics.4 Nor does it strive to analyze the legal bases for the 
district court’s decision in O’Bannon. Instead, this Essay 
endeavors to provide insight into why the district court may have 
taken a more tempered approach in its decision—perhaps to 
avoid destabilizing the entire intercollegiate athletic system. In 
addition, this Essay hopes to foreshadow some of the potential 
unintended consequences for college athletics: specifically with 
regard to Title IX advances and the robust number of sports 
currently played competitively at many of the NCAA’s member 
schools.5 These potential pitfalls are particularly relevant in light 
of the looming National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) decision 
regarding the ability for college athletes to unionize.6 In 
                                                                                                     
 3. See generally Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon 
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College 
Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
2319 (2014). The currently pending Jenkins v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association case—also referred to by many in the sports law industry as the 
Kessler case—could bring even greater change than the O’Bannon decision. 
No. 14-cv-2758 (N.D. Cal. 2014). While some have described the O’Bannon case 
as a set-back—if not a bar—to the Jenkins plaintiffs, the district court’s decision 
in O’Bannon strongly suggests that further challenges to the NCAA’s 
anticompetitive restraints could well overcome the procompetitive justifications. 
 4.  There is certainly merit to the position of compensating student 
athletes to better reflect the value they bring. Many student athletes come from 
modest backgrounds. We allow teenagers to work and get paid. And we have 
seen many young adults in their late-teens and early-twenties become incredibly 
wealthy as musicians, actors/actresses, and even as entrepreneurs. Thus, it is 
not such a stretch to consider changing a college athletic system that may have 
been originally built on a foundation of amateurism but that has certainly 
morphed into an extremely profitable enterprise for many colleges and 
universities. Nevertheless, it is outside of the scope of this Essay to fully address 
the arguments on both sides of this debate. 
 5. This Essay presumes for purposes of the following analysis that the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals does not reverse the district court’s decision. 
 6. See Lewis Lazare, NLRB Gets the Case of the Northwestern Football 
Player Union and the Wait Begins, CHICAGO BUS. J. (Aug. 1, 2014, 2:50 PM), 
http://www.bizjournals.com/chicago/news/2014/08/01/nlrb-gets-the-case-of-the-
northwestern-football.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing the matter 
pending before the NLRB regarding whether the Northwestern University 
football players can unionize) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
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highlighting some of the potential unintended consequences of 
even greater change in college athlete compensation, this Essay 
provides a cautionary context for the judiciary, the NCAA, and 
colleges and universities as they navigate the post-O’Bannon 
landscape. 
II. The O’Bannon Decision and Its Potential Impacts 
A. The District Court’s Incremental Approach 
In its O’Bannon decision, the district court allowed colleges 
and universities—beginning in 2016—to pay their college 
athletes in football and men’s basketball up to $5,000 cap per 
year (to be held in trust for the athletes until their eligibility 
expires).7 The court, however, did not provide much explanation 
or transparency regarding why the amount was capped at $5,000. 
There are some potential explanations as to why the district 
court—in setting this cap—took an incremental approach in 
advancing this change in college athletics. Indeed, there may be 
much merit to this prudent approach of beginning a gradual 
process that may well lead to student athletes receiving 
compensation more commensurate with their value to their 
respective colleges and universities.  
The district court could have taken a more ambitious 
approach, but instead it punted. The court could have potentially 
found that there were even fewer and/or less restrictive means for 
the NCAA to achieve its goals than the $5,000 amount. The court 
could have taken the position that student athletes should be able 
to earn remuneration greater than that cap—amounts more 
commensurate with the value of their athletic services and 
personae. The court could have accomplished this, for example, by 
going as far as creating a purely free market for collegiate 
athletes. Instead, the court seemed to recognize that to do so 
                                                                                                     
Review). 
 7. See Permanent Injunction, O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 
No. C-09-3329-CW, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (limiting NCAA college athlete 
pay to $5,000). The district court’s decision does not apply to non-revenue 
athletes. See id. 
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would have been to unsettle a long-established college athletic 
system that had been designed and constructed on certain 
fundamental assumptions—such as limited student-athlete 
compensation. In this regard, the district court echoes themes 
from the Flood v. Kuhn8 case, where the United States Supreme 
Court seemed unwilling—despite a clearly inaccurate precedent 
of granting an antitrust exemption to Major League Baseball 
because it had been previously found not to be engaged in 
interstate commerce—to change baseball’s reserve clause (and 
thus bring about a more robust form of free agency).9 As its 
decision demonstrated, the Supreme Court was simply unwilling 
to unsettle a well-established (and deliberately designed) player-
retention structure for baseball. The Court did not foreclose a 
legislative solution, but it refused to change judicially the status 
quo.10  
Similarly, the O’Bannon court may have realized that a 
sudden change to student-athlete compensation could well have 
posed significant economic and budgetary challenges for colleges 
and universities that are already facing difficult financial 
circumstances. In this regard, the district court may have 
correctly deduced that while more robust student-athlete 
compensation was likely inevitable, an incremental approach 
would help ensure a more stable transition. Such an approach 
would allow colleges and universities to adapt and adjust to the 
changes on the horizon. At $5,000 per student-athlete in football 
and men’s basketball, the system that is scheduled to become 
effective in 2016 would likely not be cost prohibitive for most, if 
not all, colleges and universities. Moreover, a slower transition to 
a free(r) marketplace for college athletes would also have a 
greater likelihood of success and acceptance than if a sudden 
change had occurred—one that could have led to significant 
disruptions and problems in college athletics.  
                                                                                                     
8. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 9. See generally id. (finding that professional baseball’s reserve system 
was exempt from federal antitrust laws and therefore did not violate a player’s 
right to contract). 
 10. See id. at 285 (affirming the New York Court of Appeals’s decision and 
holding that “the remedy, if any is indicated, is for congressional, and not 
judicial, action”). 
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B. The Impact of Collegiate Athletic Opportunities 
It is this eventual free(r) marketplace for college athletes and 
their services and personae that Professor Edelman excitedly 
anticipates.11 To be sure, there is much merit to Professor 
Edelman’s goal—both legally and economically. But this grander 
change—whether achieved in the immediate or in the more 
distant future—may have unintended consequences that unsettle 
college athletics in unanticipated ways. For example, a dramatic 
increase in college athlete compensation could create a tale of two 
universities—that is, a small group of well-funded colleges and 
universities that would able to pay the elite high school athletes 
to matriculate on the one hand and the vast majority of other 
schools that would be unable to compete for elite talent on the 
other hand. Some might even argue that this trend towards a 
wider gap in college athletic parity was already occurring through 
the formation and/or bolstering of the five NCAA mega-
conferences.12  
It is, ironically, this competitive imbalance that professional 
sports leagues seek to protect against with their various policies. 
Professional sports leagues attempt to avoid the consolidation of 
the most talented or “star” players into the largest media markets 
(such as New York, Los Angeles, and the like).13 Given a 
completely free marketplace, the elite athletes in professional 
sports leagues might well choose teams in these larger media 
markets because those teams would have greater resources to pay 
                                                                                                     
 11. See Edelman, supra note 3, at 2355–56. 
 12. See Matt Hinton, Division Zero: What the NCAA’s “Power Five” 
Autonomy Decision Means for the Future of College Sports, GRANTLAND.COM 
(Aug. 8, 2014), http://grantland.com/the-triangle/division-zero-what-the-ncaas-
power-five-autonomy-decision-means-for-the-future-of-college-sports/ (last 
visited Dec. 30, 2014) (discussing the NCAA’s decision regarding mega-
conference autonomy and its effect on college sports generally) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 13. See, e.g., Andrew Larsen et al., The Impact of Free Agency and the 
Salary Cap on Competitive Balance in the National Football League, 7 J. SPORTS 
ECON. 376 (2006) (“[F]ree agency and salary cap restrictions tend to promote 
competitive balance, whereas a concentration of player talent reduces 
competitiveness among teams.”).  
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higher salaries.14 In addition, the size of such media markets 
would help these players garner more lucrative endorsement 
deals and gain greater international exposure. In the absence of 
greater restraints on player movement or structural incentives 
and disincentives affecting the marketplace for elite athletes, 
professional sports leagues would likely face a situation of a lack 
of parity among teams based on their market size and revenue 
streams. Professional sports leagues worry about this potential 
phenomenon for they fear that it would hurt the long-term 
viability of smaller-market franchises and thus the overall 
stability of their respective leagues.15 In fact, competitive balance 
is sufficiently important to the strength and longevity of 
professional sports leagues that courts have even recognized this 
value as a procompetitive justification for leagues to pursue when 
imposing player restraints.16 
Given the importance of competitive balance, professional 
sports leagues have implemented a variety of restraints on 
players through collective bargaining agreements (CBA) to avoid 
competitive imbalance through such a consolidation of player 
talent in a handful of larger media markets. Such restraints 
include delays or limitations to free agency such as an amateur 
player draft and corresponding rookie contracts that enable a 
team to keep the players that they drafted for a certain number of 
years before the players reach free agency.17 Professional sports 
                                                                                                     
 14. See, e.g., Moke Hamilton, How NBA’s Luxury Tax Penalties Will Impact 
Elite Teams, BLEACHERREPORT.COM (Dec. 26, 2012), 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1457745-how-nbas-luxury-tax-penalties-will-
impact-elite-teams (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (describing the NBA’s concern, 
during the renegotiation of the NBA’s collective bargaining agreement in 2011 
that the ability for large-market teams to significantly outspend the smaller-
market teams threatened competitive balance and the long-term health of the 
league) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 15. See id. (noting concern that a large-market team may significantly 
outspend a smaller-market team). 
 16. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010) 
(“We have recognized . . . that the interest in maintaining a competitive balance 
among athletic teams is legitimate and important.” (internal quotations 
omitted)).  
 17. See Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons from the 
NFL and NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 482–83 (2013) 
(describing historical methods to impose labor restraints on players). 
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league CBAs also impose more indirect forms of restraints on 
player movement such as salary caps and maximum salary 
amounts and contract lengths.18 For example, if teams are limited 
in how much they can spend on player salaries—both 
individually and in the aggregate—it makes it almost impossible 
for a handful of teams to attract and pay all of the elite players in 
the league. The CBAs in professional sports leagues also provide 
for more favorable contractual terms for players to sign with their 
current teams before or when they become free agents to create 
incentives for players to re-sign with their teams (often the teams 
that drafted them).19 In addition, these leagues—through their 
CBAs as well as other means—attempt to provide for robust 
revenue sharing and shared revenue to minimize disparities in 
revenue between large-market and small-market teams.20 In 
doing so, these leagues attempt to create a more level playing 
field among teams for paying for a competitive roster of players. 
In all of these different manners, professional sports leagues seek 
to maintain and nurture competitive balance.  
The historical development of these various tools for seeking 
competitive balance in professional sports is a long, complex, and 
litigious tale—one that is outside the scope of this Essay. 
However, even the overview of the many avenues for achieving 
competitive balance in professional sports should provide a 
warning to those involved in college athletics. The creation of two 
unequal tiers of college athletic programs could end relative 
parity in college athletics and potentially lead to a dramatically 
                                                                                                     
 18. See Russell T. Gorkin, Sports-League Player Restraints, Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, and Federal Labor Law in the Context of the National Football 
League, 5 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 11–13 (2014) (describing salary caps in 
the context of the NFL); Matthew J. Parlow, Lessons from the NBA Lockout: 
Union Democracy, Public Support, and the Folly of the National Basketball 
Players Association, 67 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2014) (detailing maximum contract 
lengths and salary amounts in the NBA). 
 19. See Parlow, supra note 18, at 7–8 (explaining how the Larry Bird 
exception to the NBA’s salary cap provides players longer contract lengths and 
more lucrative salaries for re-signing with their current team). 
 20. See generally Justin R. Hunt, Note, To Share or Not to Share: Revenue 
Sharing Structures in Professional Sports, 13 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 139 
(2012) (noting the importance of balance between large- and small-market 
teams).  
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different system that provides far fewer opportunities for 
amateur athletes to compete at the collegiate level. It is not hard 
to imagine those colleges and universities in the non-elite tier of 
schools struggling for sponsorships, lucrative television contracts, 
alumni and booster support, and the like. One only need look to 
the disparity in attendance and revenue between professional 
teams in Major League Baseball and their minor league 
affiliates—or teams in the National Basketball Association and 
their National Basketball Development league affiliates—to get a 
sense for the decline of interest and revenue that a more 
polarized collegiate athletic system could spur. In short, these 
non-elite schools might struggle to maintain pre-O’Bannon 
revenue streams and amounts because they are no longer as 
competitive under a free(r) market for college athletes.  
Whether their revenues shrank or their costs rose under the 
new system, many colleges and universities might consider 
cutting athletic programs, particularly those that did not produce 
much, if any, revenue. Very few, if any, college athletic programs 
are self-funded or revenue-neutral (or better) in their entirety.21 
Given the economic challenges facing higher education today, one 
could foresee colleges and universities cutting costs in non-
revenue-generating athletic programs as their teams became less 
competitive, their costs for athletic programs increased, and/or 
their revenue derived from athletics declined. Absent offsetting 
cuts from elsewhere within the school’s overall budget, the only 
other option for these colleges and universities to maintain their 
athletic programs at their pre-O’Bannon levels would be to 
increase tuition for its other students. This result seems unlikely 
given the growing awareness of the challenges of student debt. 
Therefore, there is a reasonable possibility that many colleges 
and universities may cut some sports that run budgetary deficits. 
Such a reduction in athletic programs and opportunities would 
undercut one of the NCAA’s core values: “[t]he supporting role 
                                                                                                     
 21. See Steve Berkowitz, Jodi Upton & Erik Brady, Most NCAA Division I 
Athletic Departments Take Subsidies, USA TODAY (July 1, 2013, 12:48 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/05/07/ncaa-finances-
subsidies/2142443/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (noting that most of the subsidies 
come from student fees and state funding) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
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that intercollegiate athletics plays in the higher education 
mission and in enhancing the sense of community and 
strengthening the identity of member institutions.”22  
 
C. Title IX Implications 
Just as importantly, there will almost certainly be Title IX 
implications and effects based on the O’Bannon decision and 
potential changes in the collegiate athletic system. For example, 
while Title IX does not require precise equal treatment between 
male and female athletes—rather, it requires proportionality23—
there is no doubt that compensating male college football and 
basketball players will draw scrutiny from a gender equity 
perspective.24 Some have already speculated that if colleges and 
universities that pay their male football and basketball players 
up to the $5,000 stipend and fail to compensate some of their 
female athletes, these schools may well face Title IX lawsuits 
from their female athletes.25 One way to ensure Title IX 
compliance would be for schools that paid their ninety-eight 
football and men’s basketball players the stipend—eighty-five 
scholarship athletes on the football team and thirteen on the 
men’s basketball team—to also pay a matching number of 
athletes from women’s sports.26 Some schools are even 
                                                                                                     
 22. NCAA Core Values, NCAA.COM, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ncaa-core-
purpose-and-values (last visited Dec. 2, 2014) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 23. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–87 (2012) (describing treatment to which both 
sexes are entitled); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(a) (2013) (stating that discrimination in 
athletics is not allowed). 
 24. See Michael McCann, What Ed O’Bannon’s Antitrust Victory Over the 
NCAA Means Going Forward, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 9, 2014), 
http://www.si.com/college-basketball/2014/08/09/ed-obannon-ncaa-claudia-
wilken-appeal-name-image-likeness-rights (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) 
(explaining that the O’Bannon decision might lead colleges to violate Title IX) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 25. See Jon Soloman, Q&A: What the O’Bannon Ruling Means for NCAA, 
Schools and Athletes, CBS SPORTS (Aug. 9, 2014, 6:30 PM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24654805/qa-what-
the-obannon-ruling-means-for-the-ncaa-schools-and-athletes (last visited Dec. 
30, 2014) (noting that Title IX issues will arise in the wake of the O’Bannon 
decision) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 26. See Ben Strauss, After Ruling in O’Bannon Case, Determining the 
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considering paying the $5,000 stipend to all of their scholarship 
athletes.27 As these proposals demonstrate, colleges and 
universities will be carefully considering Title IX implications of 
their reactions to O’Bannon decision. 
However, there is an even greater threat to Title IX than a 
potential shift in the collegiate athletic system that the response 
to O’Bannon may bring. As mentioned above, if the costs of 
football and men’s basketball—or perhaps even all college 
sports—increase dramatically, many colleges and universities 
may well reduce a number of non-revenue-producing sports. 
Schools will be mindful of Title IX in this process. In this regard, 
colleges and universities will not make such reduction only at the 
expense of women’s sports. Rather, to remain in compliance with 
Title IX, they are more likely to reduce men’s and women’s sports 
in a roughly proportional manner. Nevertheless, the overall 
reduction in athletic opportunities—particularly those in 
women’s sports—would be a regression in the advances made by 
Title IX. Indeed, one of the great legacies of Title IX is the 
proliferation of women’s sports at the collegiate level and the 
various opportunities that this presents for these athletes—both 
in college and beyond.28  
Finally, these potential pitfalls may be acutely compounded 
by the looming NLRB’s decision regarding the ability for college 
athletes to unionize.29 The unionization of college athletes could 
further drive up costs for colleges and universities and create 
even more difficult budgetary decisions for schools with 
competitive athletic programs. Depending on the costs that the 
                                                                                                     
Future of Amateur Athletics, NY TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/sports/after-obannon-ruling-figuring-out-
whats-next.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2014) (describing four potential options 
that universities may follow) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 27. See id. (noting stipends as one of the options). 
 28. See Jane McManus, NCAA Reforms: Good for Female Athletes?, ESPN 
(Aug. 13, 2014), http://espn.go.com/espnw/news-
commentary/article/11347170/espnw-why-ncaa-reforms-really-good-really-bad-
women-sports (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (explaining that women’s sports have 
always been valued as an educational tool) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 29. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the pending NLRB 
case).  
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O’Bannon decision and unionization bring to collegiate athletics, 
it is not too far a stretch to foresee many colleges and universities 
scaling their athletic programs back to a very limited number of 
men’s and women’s sports if the costs—without corresponding 
new revenues and/or cost savings—increase significantly.  
III. Conclusion 
A free(r) marketplace for college athlete compensation is not 
necessarily bad or unwarranted. And Professor Edelman’s views 
may be correct both legally and economically. Indeed, one only 
need look at the proliferation of websites and news articles that 
document the business of college athletics to understand how a 
change to student-athlete compensation may well be justifiable 
and appropriate.30 Moreover, none of the scenarios above are 
certain to occur. The college athletic marketplace may shake out 
in a very different manner that does not unsettle the values of 
amateurism that some worry may decline under a pure, or at 
least more robust, market for student-athlete services.  
But as the various interests push to get to the far grander 
things that Professor Edelman wistfully ponders, there is likely a 
need for a cautious and judicious approach that tries to avoid the 
kind of potential unintended consequences detailed above. 
Without such a deliberate approach that balances the varied 
interests inherent in the college athletic system, we could 
experience a regression in important areas of college athletics 
that may well be valued more than the public polls regarding 
paying college athletes demonstrate. 
                                                                                                     
 30. See, e.g., The Business of College Sports, BUS. OF C. SPORTS, 
www.businessofcollegesports.com (last visited Dec. 30, 2014) (providing 
information on college athlete marketing) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
